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a b s t r a c t
Climate change can induce changes in the frequency of severe weather events representing a threat to
socio-economic development. It is thus of uttermost importance to understand how the vulnerability to
the weather of local communities is determined and how adaptation public policies can be effectively
put in place.
We focused our empirical analysis on the American Southwest. Results show that, consistently with
the predictions of an investment model, economic characteristics signaling local economic growth in the
near future decrease the level of vulnerability.
We also show that federal governments transfers and grants neither work to support recovery from
and adaptation to weather events nor to distribute their costs over a broader tax base. Finally, we show
that communities relying on municipal bonds to ﬁnance adaptation and recovery policies can beneﬁt
from local acknowledgment of the need for such policies and that they do not have to pay lenders a
premium for the risk induced by weather events.
In conclusion, our ﬁndings suggest that determinants of economic growth support lower vulner-
ability to the weather and increase options for ﬁnancing adaptation and recovery policies, but also that
only some communities are likely to beneﬁt from those processes.
& 2015 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Climate change can induce an increase in the frequency and
intensity of weather events at the global and regional scale (IPCC,
2012). To evaluate the sustainability of economic growth and welfare,
it is crucial to have a deeper understanding of how regional economic
development affects vulnerability of local communities, that is to say
the propensity to be adversely affected by the weather (IPCC, 2012).
Vulnerability to climate change is the outcome of a complex inte-
raction between climatic and socio-economic dynamics. The nat-
ural conﬁguration of the world we live in and the ever-changing
patterns of climate and weather surely inﬂuence vulnerability by
posing heterogeneous and sometimes unforeseen challenges to socio-
economic systems. Until humankind will learn to govern the climate
and the weather, only two ways are at disposal to avoid the most
harmful outcomes: mitigate the impact of human activities on the
climate and reduce the vulnerability of human systems to weather
events that is to say to adapt them.
In this work we focus on the second option and thus on the two
economic dynamics that co-determine vulnerability. First, economic
development is associated with local accumulation of economic assets
(e.g., manufacturing plants, transportation and energy infrastructures,
residential neighborhoods, etc.). The presence of economic assets
creates the possibility of being harmed by exogenous events since
those are the assets at stake, which can be damaged or lost. A hypot-
hetical region without economic assets and human presence is not
vulnerable at all just because nothing can be affected there. People,
infrastructure, and economic and social assets present in a region are
usually referred as the exposure of a region (IPCC, 2012).
Second, when there are resources at stake mitigation of natural
hazards can be implemented. Hazard mitigation means to invest
resources today in order to provide socio-economic systems with
protections from potentially disruptive weather events, today and in
the future (e.g., dams and reservoirs against ﬂoods and droughts,
building codes and elevation of ﬂood-prone properties, prescribed ﬁres
and mechanical treatments of hazardous fuels against wildﬁres, etc.).
Similarly to what said before for a region without anything
exposed, even a region with several assets exposed to the weather
could be completely not vulnerable, but that requires the highest
level of hazard mitigation possible.
Frequent news in the media about both large-scale disasters and
more common small-scale severe weather events demonstrate that
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unfortunately the example just described is theoretical only. Actual
socio-economic systems invest in hazard mitigation only up to a point,
and they thus remain signiﬁcantly vulnerable.
Understanding vulnerability thus means to study how the level
of hazard mitigation is determined in relationship with exposure.
To be more speciﬁc, in this work we address two important
research questions about vulnerability and adaptation to the
weather. First, inspired by economic theories of investment, we
investigate whether contemporary indicators of future economic
development play a role in determining the contemporary amount
of hazard mitigation and consequently on vulnerability. Second,
we investigate the ﬁnancial means policy makers have at disposal
to contribute to adaptation.
So far the focus has been on disasters that affect large areas and
require immediate emergency response and external support for
recovery. Such studies are usually macroeconomic at the state
level. When focused on impacts of weather events, they point out
the differences in damage size, recovery time, and subsequent
economic growth between countries at different stages of devel-
opment and over time (Toya and Skidmore, 2007; Noy, 2009;
Strömberg, 2007; Mirza, 2003; Loayza et al., 2012). When focused
on vulnerability, they point out the positive role of socio-
demographic variables such as education and access-to-sanit-
ation levels (Brooks et al., 2005; Paciﬁc Institute, 2010) and they
acknowledge the non-linear relationship between vulnerability
and exposure, often measuring this latter variable in terms of
GDP (Kellenberg and Mobarak, 2008; Schumacher and Strobl,
2008, 2011).
In order to answer our research questions we thus need to use a
novel analytic approach that relies on different kinds of information.
We need regional level information because weather events and
socio-economic systems are very much heterogeneous and excessive
spatial aggregation can hide relevant explanatory dyn-
amics. Furthermore, the local knowledge and context are needed to
successfully develop and implement adaptation policies (Agrawal,
2009; Adger et al., 2005; Adger, 2001) and thus we have to refer to
policy making at the local level. Second, we need to take into
consideration shorter time horizons because economies and markets
change fast and because most of weather events, albeit with lesser
impacts than seen in disasters, are short and very frequent.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Theory
From an economic viewpoint, the relationship between hazard
mitigation and exposure can be framed as an investment. In fact,
hazard mitigation requires an expensive investment today that will
probabilistically provide “revenues” in the future. The amount of
future revenues is equivalent to the losses avoided thanks to hazard
mitigation and thus to the part of exposure that is protected.
Since the seminal contributions of Keynes and Fisher, the
investment model predicts that investments are made until the
present value of expected revenues equals the marginal cost of the
investment. Formally, the level of hazard mitigation is simply
determined as L ¼ c, where L is the amount of avoided losses and
c is the marginal cost of hazard mitigation.
Empirical analyses in the literature (e.g., Kellenberg and
Mobarak, 2008; Schumacher and Strobl, 2011) have so far approxi-
mated the measurement of L with GDP, implicitly assuming an
exogenous and idiosyncratic, and time-invariant c.
GDP, though measuring an economic ﬂow, is a good approx-
imation of the existing stock of economic assets in an area, and
undoubtedly one of the most available and reliable economic
measures.
The marginal cost of hazard mitigation has not been fully
analyzed yet, but it is realistic assuming two features about it. First,
c is non-linear because several mitigations have the capability of
protecting large parts of exposed assets at once (e.g., a dam). Second,
c is globally increasing over the amount of protection because hazard
mitigation of assets dispersed in space is more expensive, and thus
those are probably the assets last to be protected.
In this work, in studying the vulnerability to the weather, we
investigate whether reducing L to GDP implies an analytic cost due
to a too short-term viewpoint in comparison with hazard mitiga-
tion investments that have a longer life cycle (e.g., riverbanks,
dams, etc.). In fact, we investigate whether other economic indic-
ators, which signal economic growth in the near future, contribute
to explain weather vulnerability.
We investigate an investment model with the same equili-
brium L ¼ c, but where the avoided losses do not consider only
the contemporary value of GDP but instead the present value of
future levels of GDP in the periods covered by the hazard mitiga-
tion investment. Formally, we consider L ¼ Pt GDPtð1þ rÞt , where r is a
discount rate and t ¼ 1…T with T equal to the duration of the
protection provided by the hazard mitigation investment.
Taking inspiration from some measures of local economies
developed in the ﬁeld of innovation studies and economic growth
(Frenken et al., 2007; Los, 2000) and from the associated theoretical
models, we consider four different types of economic dynamics
signaling future economic growth.
First, we consider Jacobs externalities (Jacobs, 1969) that are
external economies created by the presence in the same region of
ﬁrms operating in different industries. Knowledge spillovers from
different domains facilitate innovation and growth. Jacobs external-
ities are observable through measures of regional economic variety.
Second, we consider localization economies (i.e., Marshallian
externalities – David and Rosenbloom, 1990) that are external econo-
mies created by the presence in a region of multiple ﬁrms operating in
the same industry or in industries with a similar production process
from the technological perspective. The presence of several similar
ﬁrms at the edge of competition and collaboration can, again, facilitate
innovation and growth. The presence of localization economies can be
estimated through measures of technological homogeneity.
Third, we consider urbanization economies (Kawashima, 1975;
Kanemoto, 1980) that are the external economies uniquely provided
by the urban size and density of production factors. Indicators of
population density can approximate urbanization economies.
Fourth, we consider increasing returns to scale (Krugman,
1991) that are internal economies in terms of cost efﬁciencies
generated within a ﬁrm that serves large markets. Increasing
returns to scale are measurable by means of the average establish-
ment size in a region.
The model we propose aims at contributing to a deeper und-
erstanding of vulnerability by shedding light on the relationship
between exposure and hazard mitigation. The model in particular
predicts that, controlling for the current level of exposure, eco-
nomic characteristics of a region signaling its future economic
growth decrease vulnerability because they make hazard mitiga-
tion more convenient.
Then, we focus our attention on public ﬁnance and on how
recovery policies and adaptation ones, that is to say policies aimed
at reducing vulnerability, are ﬁnanced at the local level.
Starting from the theoretical model introduced above, we
acknowledge that there are hazard mitigation investments that
are directly made by households and ﬁrms, and others that require
the intervention of local governments due to needs of coordina-
tion or to the public nature of hazard mitigation. In the case of the
latter kind of hazard mitigations, local governments need to raise
funds in order to make the investment.
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Local governments usually raise funds by means of a twofold
mechanism: through transfers from upper-level governments (e.g.,
the federal and state governments and agencies in the US, the
European Union and state governments in Europe), and accessing
credit markets. The two mechanisms are often complimentary, not
alternative.
Transfers from upper-level governments are ﬁnanced through
taxes collected from a broader tax base, and they thus work often
as means to spatially share and redistribute costs. Debts collected in
credit markets will be repaid in the future by resources collected from
taxpayers in the region and thus work as a redistribution of costs over
time but in the same region. Because governments are held accoun-
table on how they spend taxpayers' money, transfers from upper-level
governments need consensus from the upper-level constituency. It
happens similarly for raising funds in credit markets, where the
consensus is expressed by markets and often takes the form of higher
or lower premiums (i.e., different levels of demanded interest rate).
Hypothesizing that the largest part of community learning
about adaptation derives from experiencing adverse effects of
weather events, we study local governments public ﬁnance after
weather events with adverse effects. In particular, we investigate
whether local governments access either upper-level resources or
credit markets to ﬁnance recovery and adaptation policies. Further,
we investigate whether premiums required by ﬁnancial markets
are sensitive to the presence of weather-induced risks.
In the following of this section we present the full dataset we
have developed for this study and the empirical models we use.
2.2. Data
All data sources refer to the period from 1998 to 2010 in the
southwestern United States, which is comprised of 548 counties in
the following eight states: California, Nevada, Arizona, Utah, Colorado,
New Mexico, Texas, and Oklahoma. This area recently has experi-
enced interesting dynamics in population and economic growth.
Summary statistics of all the variables considered in this work
are reported in Table 1 at the end of the data description. Detailed
statistics are reported in the Appendix (tables A.1–A.9).
2.2.1. Weather events
Data about weather events with adverse impacts derives from
the Storm Events Database (SED), a publication of the National
Climatic Data Center (NCDC) of the National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration (NOAA).
Storm data is transmitted to NCDC by the National Weather
Service (NWS) that, in turn, collects the data from several different
sources such as local governments emergency management ofﬁ-
cials, NWS damage surveys, the media, the insurance industry and
the general public.
SED contains weather events that have caused severe impacts
like loss of life, injuries, signiﬁcant property damage, and disrup-
tion to commerce, or unusual events that have caught media
attention. The database also includes references on other weather
events, such as record maximum and minimum temperatures and
precipitation that occur in connection with other events.
Because of the span of events included in SED, for the sake of
this analysis we select data about the six most important and
common events in the area of interest. Thus, focusing on the
American Southwest, we consider droughts, wildﬁres, snow and
ice storms, ﬂoods, funnel clouds and tornados.
The data in SED contains also measures of intensity for some
kinds of events (e.g. tornados intensities are classiﬁed with the
Fujita scale, hurricanes with the Safﬁr-Simpson scale), the number
of people affected (i.e., fatalities and injuries) and estimation of the
damage to properties and crops. However, as such information is
related to the event and cannot be spatially located with precision
within the area affected, we take into consideration only the event
as a binary variable indicating that a weather event causing
adverse impacts has happened in the affected counties.
SED records are organized by event, and several events can
derive from a storm or from the weather situation in general, such
as both drought and wildﬁres during dry weather or hail and
ﬂoods during a hurricane, and events can affect several counties at
once and last for minutes, hours, days or even months.
In order to relate events data with economic data, we transform
SED data both from the spatial viewpoint and from the tem-
poral one.
In particular, we ﬁrstly transform the data in a county level
database so that, for instance, the record of an event affecting at
the same time two counties is split in two identical events
happening within each county. Second, SED provides the begin-
ning and ending time and date of each event and we transform it
to a monthly value that counts how many events have happened
in a county in a calendar month. For instance, an event starting in
the last day of May and lasting two days is counted as two events,
one in May and one in June.
By means of those transformations, we obtain the monthly
number of events adversely affecting each county in the South-
west. Figs. 1 and 2 represent temporal dynamics and spatial
location of events respectively. Each ﬁgure shows the values for
each considered weather event and total events as well. Overall,
there are no evident temporal trends in the data, and the time
series of all extreme events, reported in the bottom panel of Fig. 1,
shows a random walk pattern. Different weather events may have
a different seasonality and spatial concentration. Analyzing total
events allows smoothing such effects.
2.2.2. Counties economies
The main source for preparing the database of the economic
characteristics of each county in the Southwest is the Quarterly
Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) administered by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
QCEW presents, at the county level and for different economic
sectors (according to the North American Industrial Classiﬁcation
Standard – NAICS), the monthly number of people employed, the
quarterly number of establishments and the average weekly wage
over the quarter.
For our purposes we consider quarterly data of employment
computed as averages of three monthly values. Furthermore, we take
into consideration data at the 2- (20 sectors) and 3-digit (99 sectors)
level in NAICS classiﬁcation. The reason for this latter choice is twofold.
Firstly, as BLS cannot disclose employment data that can lead to the
precise identiﬁcation of sensitive data (e.g., the 80/3 rule for data
suppression), data with higher level of detail in industrial differentia-
tion is more subject to non-disclosure and consequent biases. Sec-
ondly, as NAICS standards change every ﬁve years, highly detailed data
from the industrial classiﬁcation perspective (i.e., data at levels beyond
the 3-digit one) is difﬁcult to be consistently integrated over long
periods of time.
By means of quarterly aggregation of monthly employment
values, we obtain a dataset containing average quarterly values of
employment, average weekly wage and number of establishments.
Those variables, moreover, are at disposal as totals and by industry,
at the 2- and 3-digit level.
Employment data is then used to prepare the dataset about the
economic characteristics of counties in the period of interest. This
latter dataset is made by six variables for each county in each quarter.
The ﬁrst two measures of local economies concern variety and
are entropy measures (Frenken et al., 2007). The ﬁrst one is called
unrelated variety (UV) and it measures entropy at the 2-digit level.
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The second one is called related variety (RV) and it is computed as
the weighted sum of the entropy at the 3-digit level within each 2-
digit industry.
In particular, the 2-digit share for each industry g is computed as
Pg ¼
P
iA Sg pi, that is to say the sum of pi shares of the three-digit
level industries i within g. Values of piare computed as the number
of employees in industry i divided by the total number of
employees in the county. Unrelated variety is
UV ¼ PGg ¼ 1 Pg log 2 1=Pg , that is to say the sum of the multi-
plication between each 2-digit share with the logarithm of its
inverse. Related variety is given by RV ¼ PGg ¼ 1 PgHg , where the
two-digit share is multiplied by Hg , a measure of the variety within
the 2-digit sector. Hg is computed as Hg ¼
P
iASg
pi
Pg
log 2 1=ðpi=PgÞ
 
,
Table 1
Descriptive statistics on annual basis.
Variable Observations Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Number of weather events 6841 5.17 6.74 0.00 83.00
UV 6841 2.67 0.99 0.01 4.06
RV 6841 0.80 0.53 0.00 1.90
LOS 6841 0.62 0.14 0.34 1.00
Population density (population per Km2) 6841 0.59 3.14 0.00 67.20
Av. establishment size 6841 12.71 4.80 3.06 80.13
Av. weekly wage 6841 634.83 151.61 381.98 1847.46
GDP (million$) 6824 1700.00 7730.00 0.12 131,000.00
Federal expenditures and obligations 7109 7912.97 8351.69 0.00 154,353.70
Environment-related federal expenditures and obligations 7109 884.57 2373.18 0.00 33,949.04
Number of municipal bond issues 7111 1.85 2.59 0.00 12.00
Municipal bonds risk premium (2 years) 3937 0.38 0.96 3.31 6.03
Municipal bonds risk premium (3 years) 4018 0.42 0.89 3.12 6.16
Municipal bonds risk premium (5 years) 4025 0.45 0.80 2.89 6.70
Municipal bonds risk premium (10 years) 3568 0.41 0.92 5.74 6.85
Fig. 1. Monthly number of severe weather events with adverse effects in southwestern U.S. counties, 1998–2010.
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that is to say the sum of the 3-digit shares weighted by the share of
the two-digit industry they belong to and multiplied by the
logarithm of its inverse.
To be clearer, UV measures the degree of concentration of
economic activities among macro industries. On the contrary, RV
considers also concentration of economic activities within indus-
tries looking at data at the 3-digit level, that is to say one level
below macro industries. The variety of economic activities mea-
sured by RV is thus “related” because observed within a macro
sector.
Employment data at the 2-digit level is also used for computing
the LOS index, which measures the degree of similarity of
economic activities in a county according to their technology. In
particular, the index is LOSkt ¼
Pn
i ¼ 1
Pn
j ¼ 1 sikt U sjkt Uaijyð ÞPn
i ¼ 1
Pn
j ¼ 1 sikt U sjktð Þ
, where sikt is
the employment in county k in period t in sector i, and aijy is the
technological similarity between industry i and industry j in year y
as in Los (2000) and computed over the 2-digit level annual
national input-output table obtained using Use and Supply mat-
rixes published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). In
summary, the LOS index compares each possible couple of 2-digit
industries on the similarity of the technology they adopt, and
weights results depending on the relevance of considered sectors.
In our dataset, the LOS index is a quarterly measure because aijy are
annual values but sikt vary every quarter.
Fourth, the logarithm of the density of the population is used as a
proxy of urbanization. In order to compute such an index, two values
are needed for each county. They are the area of the county and its
population. The Census Bureau publishes both values: counties
areas are computed from the TIGER/Geographic Identiﬁcation Code
Scheme (TIGER/GICS – updated every 10 years) and population from
Population Estimates Program (PEP – annual values). Population
density is computed by dividing county population by county area,
and the resulting measure is in terms of number of people per
square meter.
Last, using the dataset derived from QCEW, we consider qua-
rterly average establishment size in terms of employment, as
resulting from the total number of jobs divided by the number
of establishments. Similarly, from QCEW we use average weekly
wages at the county level.
In summary, the six measures of local economies we use are:
unrelated variety (UV), related variety (RV), the LOS index (i.e., a
measure of technological similarity), a measure of urbanization
(i.e., the logarithm of the population density), the average
Fig. 2. Total number of severe weather events with adverse effects in southwestern U.S. counties, 1998–2010.
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establishment size and the average weekly wage. They are all
quarterly and at the county level.
The two measures of economic variety (i.e., UV and RV) are used to
measure the presence of Jacobs externalities. The LOS index, a measure
of technological homogeneity, is used as a measure of localization
economies. The measure of urbanization is used to proxy the presence
of urbanization economies. The average establishment size measures
the presence of internal increasing returns to scale. Finally, the aver-
age weekly wage measures and controls for the presence of both
particularly successful businesses and personal non-productive assets
owned by households (e.g., luxury houses, recreation vehicles, etc.).
In conclusion, as approximate measure of economic assets
exposed to natural hazards in each quarter, we consider counties
quarterly GDP estimated by multiplying, industry by industry, the
national total GDP per employee to the ﬁgures of employment in
each county.
2.2.3. Public ﬁnance
We use data about federal government expenditures and
obligations recorded in the Consolidated Federal Funds Report
(CFFR) published by the Census Bureau. The data is consolidated
by ﬁscal year and it includes data at the state, county and sub-
county level.
In our analysis we select only data at the county level and for all
kinds of recipients, and we focus on some selected object cate-
gories and on some speciﬁc federal agencies. In particular, as we
are interested in evaluating the provision of funds from the federal
government after the happening of weather events, we exclude
from the dataset transfers of funds aimed at “retirement and
disability” and at “salaries and wages” as they should not be
impacted by events. The object categories we consider are thus
“other direct payments”, “grants”, “procurement contracts”, “direct
loans”, “guaranteed or insured loans” and “insurance”.
Values are denominated in 2010 prices, obtained by correcting
current values with Consumers Price Index (CPI) values published
by BLS.
Besides looking at total federal transfers as made by totals of
the just mentioned categories, in addition we focus on funds
distributed by agencies specialized in environmental and disaster
recovery interventions. The agencies we consider for computing
environmental funds are reported in Table A.5 along the category
where their transfers can be found in CFFR.
Data about municipal bonds comes from the Electronic Muni-
cipal Market Access website managed by the Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board.
The data we select concerns primary offerings in counties: as
the original data does not contain the Federal Information Proces-
sing Standard code of the county where the bond has been issued
but only the information about the state where the issuer is, we
adopt a word matching algorithm. In particular, within bonds
issued in a state we search either in the ﬁeld of the name of the
issuer or in the name of the bond for the name of a county or for
the name of incorporated cities within that state. We thus select
only the data for which we can assign the municipal bond to a
uniquely identiﬁed county. Said in other words, we exclude two
main categories of municipal bonds. Firstly we exclude bonds
issued by states for projects impacting at the state level or even
just on more than one county. Secondly, we do not consider bonds
for which we can infer neither the location of the issuer nor the
location of the project for which the bond is issued.
The resulting database of municipal bonds refers to bonds
issued by agencies localized within a county or for projects
addressed at a speciﬁc county. The data set is consolidated by
month and by county, and it contains the following ﬁelds: number
of bond issuances, total amount issued, average annual adjusted
interest rates at 2, 3, 5 and 10 years maturities (weighted over
the issued amount of each bond, by maturity). Interest rates are
adjusted by correcting nominal interest rates with initial offer-
ing prices.
It is important stressing that the data we have at disposal does
not allow differentiating between general obligations and reve-
nue bonds.
Furthermore, we select from the Statistical Releases and His-
torical Data of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System average monthly values of some variables. In particular we
select the values of nominal return rates of US Treasury constant
securities for the same maturities we consider in municipal bonds
(i.e., 2, 3, 5 and 10 years). We then compute, for municipal bonds, a
set of new variables, one for each maturity, that we call “risk
premiums”: they are the difference between the municipal bond
adjusted nominal interest and the nominal interest of treasury
bills. By means of that we obtain, by county and by month, the
average risk premium paid by municipal bond issuers respectively
to costs paid by the federal government at the same time and for
similar products with the same maturity.
Furthermore, from the same source we add to our dataset three
more variables that are useful to control for exogenous ﬁnancial
markets dynamics, that is to say the Dow Jones Industrial Average
of 30 signiﬁcant stocks traded on NYSE, the Moody's index for
utility and industrial corporate bonds with Aaa rating and 30 years
maturity, and the Bond Buyer Index for general obligation bonds
with 20 years maturity issued by states and other local govern-
ments. Some descriptive statistics of the resulting dataset are
reported in Tables A.8 and A.9.
2.3. Empirical models
The models we study are aimed at answering the research
questions introduced in the description of our theoretical approach.
We are interested in verifying if better measurements of exposure
that include expectations on future dynamics can improve our
understanding of vulnerability determination.
At the same time, about the public ﬁnance of adaptation policies,
we ﬁrst investigate if the central government supports local govern-
ments allowing a more equal and wider (i.e., over a broader tax base)
distribution of the costs of recovery and adaptation and second we
investigate whether privately-owned ﬁnancial resources play a
similar role through credit markets.
2.3.1. Vulnerability
We analyze vulnerability controlling for the level of exposure
faced by counties and using ﬁxed effects regression models with
temporal dummies to control for exogenous causes of vulnerabil-
ity, such as the natural conﬁguration of counties, and uncertainty
and temporary shifts in the weather.
In particular, we consider the quarterly number of events as the
dependent variable. For this variable, positive discrete values have
an over-dispersed and positively skewed distribution (Appendix
Fig. A.1 and Table A.10) with a standard deviation greater than its
mean. For this reason, we use a conditional ﬁxed effects negative
binomial regression (Hausman et al., 1984) to estimate the model,
where ﬁxed effects apply to the distribution of the over-dispersion
parameter and groups represent counties (Eq. (1)).
As proximate indicator of the exposure of economic assets to
natural hazards, in the right-hand side of the equation model we
introduce the log of GDP as an offset variable, with its coefﬁcient
constrained to 1. The use of the log of GDP as an offset variable
allows weighting the different risks each county is facing. The risk
of a hazardous weather event is not equal for each county
(Appendix Fig. A.2). For instance, counties with several economic
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assets and/or a large population may experience more hazardous
weather events than counties with less economic assets and/or
with a small population, but the number of events may occur at
the same rate once controlling for different levels of potential
exposure. The introduction of this variable changes the interpreta-
tion of the dependent variable. The dependent variable is trans-
formed from a severe weather events count to a rate, where the
rate is the count of weather events occurring per level of GDP. A
replication of the model using county annual population as an
offset variable instead of GDP provides similar results.
Explanatory variables are the economic indicators introduced
in Section 2.2.2 (i.e., unrelated and related variety, the LOS
index, urbanization, the average establishment size and the
average weekly wage). Furthermore, in the regression we control
for year, quarter, and state dummies and for year and state
interactions.
The resulting negative binomial model is
lnðN_eventsitÞ ¼ θiþω lnðGDPitÞþβ0Xþskþλyskþγqþεit ; ð1Þ
where the coefﬁcient ω is constrained to 1. Moving the log of GDP
to the left-hand side of the equation, the model can be expressed
as follows:
ln
N_eventsit
GDPit
 
¼ θiþβ0Xþλyþskþλyskþγqþεit ;
where lnðN_eventsitÞ represents the negative binomial log-link
transformation of the number of events in each county i¼ 1⋯N in
period t ¼ 1⋯T (quarterly), GDPit is the GDP in county i in quarter
t, θi ¼ αi=ϕi with αi the individual, speciﬁc, effect of each county i,
ϕi is the negative binomial overdispersion parameter that can take
any value and varies across counties, X is the matrix of the six
variables xvit (v¼ 1…6) describing local economic characteristics
in county i in period t, λy is the year dummy variable with
y¼ 1998⋯2010, sk is the state dummy with k¼ 1⋯8 states, λysk
is the interacted variable of year and state dummies, γq is the
quarter dummy with q¼ 1…4 quarters, and εit is the error term.
The six variables in xvit , measured in different units, are
standardized as z-scores in order to allow their comparison during
regressions: each value is thus subtracted from the mean of the
sample and divided by standard deviation. The sample considered
for standardization is the one used for regression. In order to
estimate the model with robust standard errors, we run the esti-
mation with a bootstrap method with 1000 repetitions.
In summary, our research interest is on the role that economic
characteristics play in determining vulnerability, and we thus
control for GDP as offset variable and we implement a set of tools
to control for nature-related causes. In particular, we use a quarter
dummy to control for seasonality, a year dummy to control for
global weather patterns such as surface ocean currents, a state
dummy to control for stable regional weather differences and an
interacted dummy between year and state to control for time-
variant regional weather patterns. Finally, the unobserved indivi-
dual effect estimated by the regression model is an individual
over-dispersion parameter that accounts for the different uncer-
tainty in the weather that exists in each county.
2.3.2. Public ﬁnance
The analysis of federal expenditures and obligations has been
conducted over ﬁscal years since federal government data is
available only aggregated over ﬁscal years.
The ﬁrst dependent variable we consider is the per capita total
amount of expenditures and obligations (in constant dollars at
2010 prices) from the federal government in the ﬁscal year as
explained in Section 2.2.3.
On the right-hand side of the equation we use the number of
events in previous ﬁscal year, dummies for each ﬁscal year and for
quartiles of population, and the urbanization measure. The resulting
model is
Tit ¼ β1N_eventsit1þγ0pop_catitþβ2urbitþλtþαiþεit ; ð2Þ
where Tit is the value of annual per capita transfers from the federal
government to recipients in county i¼ 1⋯N in ﬁscal year t ¼
1998⋯2010, N_eventsit1 is the number of events happened in a
county the previous ﬁscal year, pop_cati is a variable saying to which
population quartile the county belongs to in the ﬁscal year, urbit is
the value of the urbanization variable for county i in ﬁscal year t, λt is
the year dummy, αi captures individual speciﬁc county effects, and
εit is the error term.
The model considers unobserved individual differences at the
county level that remain time-invariant and changes in the
economic cycle, in government spending and in ﬁscal and other
policies through the year dummy.
The model is estimated with a conditional ﬁxed effects linear
regression where groups are counties. Since there could be cross-
sectional dependence in our data, we compute standard errors
with the Driscoll–Kraay method (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998).
Analyses of issuances of municipal bonds are done over a
monthly frequency and looking at events happened up to two
years before the issuance as its process can take several months if
not years.
In particular, ﬁrstly we study a model about the probability of
issuing new bonds: the dependent variable takes the 0 value if in
that county there has not been issuance of municipal bonds in that
month, and 1 otherwise.
On the right-hand side of the equation we have the total
number of events in the 4 semesters preceding the considered
month, the three indexes of ﬁnancial markets explained at the end
of Section 2.2.3, dummy variables for population quartiles and
years, and the measure of urbanization.
Formally, the equation is
Bit ¼ β1
X6
j ¼ 1 N_eventsi;t jþβ2
X12
j ¼ 7 N_eventsi;t j
þβ3
X18
j ¼ 13 N_eventsi;t jþβ4
X24
j ¼ 19 N_eventsi;t j
þδ0 f inancetþγ0pop_catitþβ5urbiyþλyþskþλyskþαiþεit ; ð3Þ
where Bit takes the value 1 if in county i¼ 1⋯N at time t ¼ 1⋯T
(monthly) there have been issuances of bonds and 0 otherwise,P6
j ¼ 1 N_eventsi;t j is the total number of events happened in that
county in the preceding semester, f inancet contains the values of
the three variables about ﬁnancial markets (Dow Jones, Moody's
Corporate Bonds, Bond Buyer) in that period, urbiy is the urbaniza-
tion index of county i in year y, λy is the year dummy variable, sk is
the state dummy with k¼ 1⋯8 states, λysk is the interacted
variable of year and state dummies, αi captures the individual
unobserved heterogeneity, and εit is the random component.
Besides considering county-level and time-invariant unobserved
characteristics through the ﬁxed-effect parameter, the model con-
siders changes and differences in the local economy and ﬁnancial
markets through the year dummy, the state dummy and their
interacted variable. Further, exogenous short-run dynamics happen-
ing in ﬁnancial markets are captured by ﬁnancial indices.
The regression model is estimated with a conditional ﬁxed effects
logistic regression (groups are counties) bootstrapped 1000 times. In
particular, the logistic ﬁxed effects regression uses only within-
individual differences to estimate changes in the probability of events.
Similarly, we study as dependent variable the risk premium
paid by local governments to lenders, computed as the difference
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between the adjusted interest granted by municipal bonds and the
one of U.S. Treasury bonds with the same maturity.
Formally, the equation is
Rit ¼ β1
X6
j ¼ 1 N_eventsi;t jþβ2
X12
j ¼ 7 N_eventsi;t j
þβ3
X18
j ¼ 13 N_eventsi;t jþβ4
X24
j ¼ 19 N_eventsi;t jþδ
0f inancet
þγ0pop_catitþβ5urbiyþλyþskþλyskþαiþεit ð4Þ
where all explanatory variables are as in Eq. (3) and the dependent
variable, Rit , is a continuous variable representing the risk pre-
mium paid by county i¼ 1⋯N at time t ¼ 1⋯T ðmonthlyÞ . The
estimation has been made with a conditional ﬁxed effects linear
regression model and, since there could be cross-sectional depen-
dence in our data, standard errors are computed with the Driscoll–
Kraay method.
3. Results
3.1. Vulnerability
Results are presented in Table 2 in form of incidence rate ratios
for explanatory variables. An incidence rate ratio greater than
1 means that the probability of the dependent variable is
increased, otherwise a value less than 1 means a decrease in
probability. For instance, if unrelated variety UV¼1 the probability
of an event is 0.827 of what it would be with UV¼0, being 0.827
the value of the coefﬁcient of UV presented in Table 2. All
explanatory variables are signiﬁcant and show a decrease in
the probability of an event as they increase. Urbanization is the
most relevant determinant among the considered characteristics
because it allows the largest decrease in the probability of weather
events with adverse effects.
3.2. Public ﬁnance
Results of the estimation of the ﬁrst model described in
Section 2.3.2 are presented in Table 3. They do not point out
signiﬁcant effects in per capita transfers from the federal govern-
ment after weather events. A replication of the model with events
in current ﬁscal year instead of the ones in the previous ﬁscal year
provides similar results.
On the contrary, coefﬁcients regarding population quartiles and
urbanization point out decreasing per capita transfers from the
federal government as county population and density grow.
Selecting among all funds transferred from the federal govern-
ment only expenditures and obligations made by federal agencies
working in the ﬁelds of environmental protection and emergency
recovery, as detailed in Section 2.2.3, the dependent variable
becomes the per capita amount of transfer from federal agencies
working on environmental and emergency issues.
Results presented in Table 4 show that federal transfers in
environmental protection and emergency management are not
sensitive to weather events. Replication of the model with events
occurred in current ﬁscal year in the right-hand side of the
equation conﬁrms this result. Similarly to the previous case,
urbanization comes along a decrease in federal transfers from
environmental and emergency agencies.
Passing to the analysis of municipal bonds, results presented in
Table 5 show that the probability of having issuances of new
municipal bonds is increased of almost 1% by a weather event
happened between 13 and 18 months before. Two other signiﬁcant
explanatory variables are the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the
Bond Buyer index. In particular, an increase of the stock market index
slightly increases the probability of bond issuance, probably because it
means a relative abundance of capital in ﬁnancial markets allowing
lower debt costs. On the contrary, an increase of the Bond Buyer index
Table 2
Conditional ﬁxed-effects negative binomial regression model estimates on vulner-
ability to severe weather events with adverse effects, incidence rate ratio estimates.
Dependent variable
Number of severe weather events per level of GDP
Explanatory variables
Unrelated variety – UV 0.827nn (0.061)
Related variety – RV 0.766nnn (0.041)
Technological homogeneity – LOS 0.813nnn (0.038)
Urbanization 0.386nnn (0.042)
Average establishment size 0.797nnn (0.061)
Average weekly wage 0.676nnn (0.041)
Year effects yes (Prob.4F: 0.000)
Quarter effects yes (Prob.4F: 0.000)
State effects yes (Prob.4F: 0.000)
Year state dummies yes (Prob.4F: 0.000)
Constant 0.000nnn (0.000)
Observations 26,409
Log likelihood 36,774.188
Note: Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses.
nnn Signiﬁcant at 0.01 level. nn Signiﬁcant at 0.05 level. n Signiﬁcant at 0.10 level.
Table 3
Fixed-effects regression model estimates on per capita total federal transfers.
Dependent variable
Per capita total federal transfers
Explanatory variables
Number of events in previous ﬁscal year 4.822 (6.067)
2nd Quartile on population (25–50%) 343.781 (243.825)
3rd Quartile on population (50–75%) 1057.410nn (433.493)
4th Quartile on population (75–100%) 1059.700nn (531.413)
Urbanization 4058.534nnn (1394.840)
Year effects yes (Prob.4F: 0.000)
Constant 41,636.300nn (16,287.480)
Observations 7109
Within R2 0.206
Note: Driscoll–Kraay standard errors (robust to heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation
and cross-sectional dependence) are in parentheses.
nnn Signiﬁcant at 0.01 level. nn Signiﬁcant at 0.05 level. n Signiﬁcant at 0.10 level.
Table 4
Fixed-effects regression model estimates on per capita federal transfers by
environmental and emergency agencies.
Dependent variable
Per capita federal transfers by environmental and emergency agencies
Explanatory variables
Number of events in previous ﬁscal year 0.316 (2.646)
2nd Quartile on population (25–50%) 370.833 (278.385)
3rd Quartile on population (50–75%) 423.532 (372.562)
4th Quartile on population (75–100%) 198.061 (399.549)
Urbanization 1973.211nn (832.283)
Year effects yes (Prob.4F: 0.000)
Constant 22,797.330nn (9979.521)
Observations 7109
Within R2 0.023
Note: Driscoll–Kraay standard errors (robust to heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation
and cross-sectional dependence) are in parentheses.
nnn Signiﬁcant at 0.01 level. nn Signiﬁcant at 0.05 level. n Signiﬁcant at 0.10 level.
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decreases the probability of issuance because it means that local
governments cost of borrowing is increasing (and the return to
lenders is increasing as well).
Furthermore, Table 6 shows that events happened between 13 and
18 months before not only increase the probability of issuance but
they also decrease the premium paid for short term maturities to
lenders, that is to say that they decrease the cost of debt borrowed by
local governments.
Estimated coefﬁcients of ﬁnancial markets indexes conﬁrm what
found before, in fact increases in Dow Jones Industrial Average slightly
decrease the cost of debt as capital is abundant in ﬁnancial markets,
and the Bond Buyer index has the opposite effect as it means higher
costs for money borrowers. Furthermore, in this model we also ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant negative effect of corporate bonds: as their index increases,
the premium paid by municipal bonds decreases.
4. Discussion
Our analysis conﬁrms the hypothesis that economic measures
suggesting future economic growth decrease weather vulnerability
because they make investments to mitigate weather hazards look
more proﬁtable.
Reminding that the analysis is done on standardized z-scores
and thus coefﬁcients are comparable, we note that the largest
reduction in vulnerability is associated with urbanization (Table 2).
Other measures such as variety ones have a smaller impact.
We identify three possible explanations of this pattern in
coefﬁcients, which are not mutually exclusive. An explanation
could simply be that urbanization economies are particularly rele-
vant, or stronger than others. They identify larger future growth
and, consequently, stronger hazard mitigation.
Table 5
Conditional ﬁxed-effects logistic regression model estimates on municipal bonds issuances, odd ratio estimates.
Binary dependent variable
Issuance of municipal bonds
Explanatory variables
Number of past events (between 1 and 6 months before) 1.005 (0.004)
Number of past events (between 7 and 12 months before) 1.003 (0.004)
Number of past events (between 13 and 18 months before) 1.009nn (0.005)
Number of past events (between 19 and 24 months before) 1.004 (0.004)
Dow Jones Industrial Average 1.000nn (0.000)
Moody's Industrial Corporate Bonds index 0.991 (0.067)
Bond Buyer index 0.812nnn (0.058)
2nd Quartile on population (25–50%) 1.361 (0.496)
3rd Quartile on population (50–75%) 1.590 (0.692)
4th Quartile on population (75–100%) 1.827 (0.823)
Urbanization 1.558 (0.435)
Year effects yes (Prob.4F: 0.000)
Observations 78,000
Pseudo R2 0.004
Note: Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses.
nnn Signiﬁcant at 0.01 level. nn Signiﬁcant at 0.05 level. n Signiﬁcant at 0.10 level.
Table 6
Fixed-effects regression model estimates on the cost of debt for municipal bonds with different maturities.
Dependent variable
Cost of debt for municipal bonds
Maturity: 2 years 3 years 5 years 10 years
Explanatory variables
Number of past events (1–6 months before) 0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002)
Number of past events (7–12 months before) 0.001 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.000 (0.003)
Number of past events (13–18 months before) 0.005nn (0.002) 0.006nn (0.002) 0.005nn (0.002) 0.005 (0.003)
Number of past events (19–24 months before) 0.000 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.003 (0.002) 0.001 (0.003)
Dow Jones Industrial Average 0.000nnn (0.000) 0.000nnn (0.000) 0.000nnn (0.000) 0.000nnn (0.000)
Moody's Industrial Corporate Bonds index 0.745nnn (0.129) 0.826nnn (0.137) 0.888nnn (0.136) 0.873nnn (0.154)
Bond Buyer index 0.564nnn (0.176) 0.549nnn (0.173) 0.583nnn (0.163) 0.674nnn (0.158)
2nd Quartile on population (25–50%) 0.238n (0.124) 0.196 (0.120) 0.099 (0.190) 0.122 (0.321)
3rd Quartile on population (50–75%) 0.248 (0.173) 0.205 (0.139) 0.269 (0.218) 0.139 (0.357)
4th Quartile on population (75–100%) 0.339 (0.208) 0.318n (0.171) 0.335 (0.249) 0.130 (0.382)
Urbanization 0.208 (0.152) 0.248n (0.145) 0.267n (0.147) 0.316 (0.199)
Year effects yes (Prob.4F: 0.000) yes (Prob.4F: 0.000) yes (Prob.4F: 0.000) yes (Prob.4F: 0.000)
Year State dummies yes (Prob.4F: 0.000) yes (Prob.4F: 0.000) yes (Prob.4F: 0.000) yes (Prob.4F: 0.000)
Constant 3.965nn (1.580) 5.221nnn (1.587) 5.984nnn (1.646) 6.122nnn (2.136)
Observations 10,802 11,287 11,560 10,085
Within R2 0.608 0.563 0.507 0.273
Note: Driscoll–Kraay standard errors (robust to heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-sectional dependence) are in parentheses.
nnn Signiﬁcant at 0.01 level. nn Signiﬁcant at 0.05 level. n Signiﬁcant at 0.10 level.
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Another possible explanation could be that the economic
characteristics carry on different levels of dependence on envir-
onmental resources and thus different levels of sensibility or
susceptibility to weather events (IPCC, 2012). This explanation
suggests a further modiﬁcation to the theoretical model.
To illustrate this possible explanation of the values of coefﬁ-
cients, we use the coefﬁcients of urbanization and of measures of
variety (either UV or RV). First, we consider that a strong stress on
environmental resources is usually associated with urban envir-
onments (Jahn, 2013). For instance, concretized waterways often
make cities more prone to ﬂoods than streams ﬂowing in more
natural settings because of issues related to drainage and space.
Similarly, urban centers require concentrating and delivering
much potable water to relatively small areas, and that makes
more difﬁcult to differentiate the portfolio of water sources and
to deal with periods of severe drought. Second, and from the
opposite perspective, when a regional economy is varied, the
probability of being adversely affected by the weather can be
reduced. For instance, not too much severe drought can be
tolerated by a region with a broad portfolio of economic activities,
but the same event can have harsh adverse effects in a region
specialized in a few industries such as agriculture or tourism. A
varied economy diversiﬁes also the risks associated with economic
activities, including environmental ones.
The coefﬁcients we observed are thus consistent with a
modiﬁed version of the model computing expected losses due to
weather hazards. In particular, we propose L ¼ Ptp  GDPtð1þ rÞt where
the modiﬁcation is the introduction of p, that is to say a probability
of loss due to the regional economic conﬁguration.
It is important to underline a few features of p that could be
misinterpreted. In fact, p is not associated to any weather dyna-
mics or natural conﬁguration of hazards, since our analysis controlled
for those issues and considered them exogenous. On the contrary, p is
entirely determined by the conﬁguration of the regional economy.
Higher levels of probability p are associated with economic character-
istics that make adverse effects more probable because of the
dependence on natural resources (i.e., urbanization).
The modiﬁed model thus suggests that a higher p increases the
proﬁtability of hazard mitigation and thus decreases vulnerability.
A further explanation of the strong coefﬁcient associated with
urbanization is related to the other part of the theoretical model,
which is the marginal cost of hazard mitigation.
For instance consider two regions with similar populations,
exposure and economic characteristics but with different popula-
tion density. The less rural region can plausibly show a different,
lower, marginal cost for protecting assets from many weather
events because assets are spatially concentrated. It is for instance
the case with several infrastructures such as dams, reservoirs, and
feeder canals. Similarly, this is valid for ﬁre-preventing burns and
cuts and for tornado warning systems. Protecting rural houses and
dispersed manufacturing plants with those tools can be much
more expensive than if they were concentrated in an urban area.
Under this hypothesis, our model predicts less vulnerability
because of a lower marginal cost of hazard mitigation.
Passing to the analysis of public policies, we ﬁrstly want to
stress that recovery and adaptation policies cannot be separated.
We focused on public ﬁnance of local governments because it is
the government level that can most efﬁciently and effectively
implement policies due to its localized knowledge (Adger et al.,
2005; Adger, 2001; Næss et al., 2005).
Initially, we focused on federal government expenditures (e.g.,
salaries, procurement contracts, and other direct payments) and
obligations (e.g., grants, loans, insurance) to all types of recipients in
considered counties. We studied whether federal monetary transfers
to local communities increase after weather events to support local
governments implementation of recovery and adaptation policies.
Surprisingly, our analysis results show that federal transfers do not
correlate with severe weather events (Table 3).
Furthermore, even if we select among federal government
expenditures and obligations only the ones made by agencies
working on environmental protection and emergency response,
results do not show any signiﬁcant impact of past and contem-
porary weather events (Table 4). It means that transfers from the
federal government are not tools for ﬁnancing adaptation policies
or for distributing the costs of recovery over a broader tax base.
Because federal government expenditures do not correlate to
weather events we focused on municipal bonds since they are the
primary tool for ﬁnancing public policies implementation in U.S.
local governments.
Results show that the probability of issuing new bonds is
signiﬁcantly increased by the number of weather events that
occur from 13 to 18 months before (Table 5). This conﬁrms that
municipalities issue bonds to ﬁnance policies related to severe
weather events. The process for issuing municipal bonds is long,
and requires the voters' approval so the time between events and
the issuance of bonds is not surprising. Weather events with
adverse effects drive policy makers to design adaptation policies
and drive the constituency to agree on the need for them.
We also examined whether the municipal bond market per-
ceives a greater risk for bonds issued within counties that have a
climatic risk, reﬂected in higher interest rates.
The analysis indicates (Table 6) that municipal bond markets do
not charge local governments a premium for those risks. On the
contrary, the occurrence of a weather event with adverse effects
lowers their debt cost by about 0.5% for short maturities. This result
suggests that the agreement and commitment of the local community
is so widespread that local bond buyers, who are a large part of bond
buyers because of ﬁscal incentives, are willing to accept lower
interests for bonds aimed at reducing local vulnerabilities.
In conclusion our results on vulnerability can be extended to
other developed countries that share the same determinants of
economic growth. Findings about adaptation policies and public
ﬁnance depend on the institutional framework of the country and
thus can be extended to the entire U.S. only.
5. Conclusions
We have shown here that characteristics of the local economy
impact vulnerability, and we also know that those same charac-
teristics determine local employment and productivity growth
(Frenken et al., 2007; Castaldi et al., 2013).
From a longer run perspective and by relating our measures of
local economic characteristics with the drivers of economic
development, we can conclude that in the sample we studied
economic growth goes in with lower vulnerability to weather
events. However, the other side of the coin is that peripheral areas
could neither be prone to economic growth nor going to become
less vulnerable, in particular if they are rural areas and differen-
tiated in just a few industries with diverse production processes.
Similarly, if we take into consideration the public ﬁnancing of
policies aimed at reducing vulnerability, we know that counties with
small population can have problematic access to municipal bond
markets as the issuing process has high ﬁxed costs and the local
demand is limited. On a per capita basis, those “small” counties
receive more transfers from upper-level governments (Table 3), but
those transfers do not seem to be aimed at adaptation policies.
In conclusion, communities growing both in terms of economy
and population density are more exposed but also less vulnerable
and they appear having at disposal the means for ﬁnancing
adaptation policies. On the other hand other areas, even if less
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exposed, are more vulnerable and they lack an appropriate
ﬁnancing tool to cope with climatic risks.
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Appendix
Data
Weather events
Tables A.1 and A.2 present total values of monthly events by
year and by state, respectively. Total values for each of the six
kinds of events are presented along the sum of them in the last
column.
Data refers to weather events with adverse impacts on local
communities. Table A.2 points out that the lack of droughts in
Arizona and Nevada in the dataset (as reported in the second
column of Table A.2) does not mean that such weather conditions
have not happened in those states but that events of that kind
have not been reported adversely impacting local communities.
Characteristics of local economies
In Tables A.3 and A.4 the average county values of the variables
we use for describing local economic characteristics are presented
by year and by state, respectively. Data reported in tables is in
absolute terms as resulting from the deﬁnition of variables
described in the paper. Salary values are reported at 2010 prices,
correcting current values with the Consumer Price Index (CPI)
published by BLS.
Values in our dataset, as reported in Table A.3, point out that
over time there has been a trend towards concentration of
economic activities (decreasing variety indexes) in considered
counties, and also a trend in adopting more similar technologies
(increasing LOS index). Other variables, like the average establish-
ments size, do not show any clear tendency. Table A.4 points out
higher average values of urbanization in California than in the Four
Corners region and Nevada, as expected.
Federal expenditures and obligations
Table A.5 presents the federal agencies we consider to estimate
the amount of expenditures and obligations aimed at addressing
environmental public policies. The second column of the table
describes the category of expenditures and obligations used by
agencies and recorded in the Consolidated Federal Funds Report
(CFFR).
Average per capita values of federal expenditures and obliga-
tions provided by environmental and emergency recovery agen-
cies are presented in the third column of Tables A.6 and A.7,
evaluated at 2010 prices.
Municipal bonds and other ﬁnancial information
In the second column of Tables A.8 and A.9 is reported the
average percentage of counties issuing new municipal bonds in
the period and in the state, respectively. Because the dataset is
built on a monthly basis, such a percentage takes the 100% value if
all counties (either in a year or in a state) make every month at
least one issuance of bonds.
Data reported in following columns, from the third column on,
presents percentage points of difference between the municipal
bond adjusted nominal interest and the nominal interest of
Treasury bills with the same maturity. As mentioned in the paper,
this variable represent the risk premium paid by local govern-
ments net of modiﬁcations of public bond returns measured by
Government bills.
The risk premium for local governments can take negative and
positive values. In particular Table A.8 points out that after economic
crises the expansive monetary response decreases the ofﬁcial interest
rate and makes premiums increasing (e.g., consider values after 2000
and 2007). It is thus important in the regression model to include
temporal dummies to capture impacts of the changes in national
monetary policy.
Table A.1
Total number of monthly events with adverse effects by year.
Year Droughts Wildﬁres Snow and ice storms Floods Funnel clouds Tornados Total events
1998 715 21 879 1162 112 295 3184
1999 103 96 757 896 63 408 2323
2000 711 108 1219 853 54 276 3221
2001 283 95 971 881 69 273 2572
2002 185 207 697 1072 24 235 2420
2003 298 150 663 726 63 299 2199
2004 104 64 833 1535 99 342 2977
2005 467 81 732 958 73 194 2505
2006 1661 212 910 796 54 160 3793
2007 197 85 1294 1881 43 309 3809
2008 245 164 1007 753 32 227 2428
2009 543 127 1116 723 12 163 2684
2010 60 46 1379 705 22 213 2425
Total 5572 1456 12,457 12,941 720 3394 36,540
Table A.2
Total number of monthly events with adverse effects by state.
State Droughts Wildﬁres Snow and
ice storms
Floods Funnel
clouds
Tornados Total
events
AZ 0 40 182 904 93 46 1265
CA 109 754 2261 1332 203 91 4750
CO 393 191 3487 633 82 545 5331
NM 240 3 227 606 36 80 1192
NV 0 0 506 204 4 18 732
OK 1064 68 2139 1706 16 861 5854
TX 3622 367 3073 7190 271 1732 16,255
UT 144 33 582 366 15 21 1161
Total 5572 1456 12,457 12,941 720 3394 36,540
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Table A.3
Average county values of economic variables by year.
Year Unrelated variety – UV Related variety – RV Technological homogeneity – LOS Urbanization Average weekly wage Average establishment size
1998 2.881 0.939 0.546 11.611 597.056 12.932
1999 2.890 0.937 0.552 11.610 602.098 12.899
2000 2.896 0.943 0.564 11.621 611.190 13.076
2001 2.654 0.794 0.651 11.700 616.678 12.838
2002 2.622 0.773 0.652 11.681 616.115 12.570
2003 2.646 0.769 0.642 11.663 619.325 12.508
2004 2.608 0.760 0.638 11.672 626.113 12.501
2005 2.616 0.764 0.639 11.669 631.662 12.775
2006 2.616 0.763 0.638 11.645 648.984 12.901
2007 2.635 0.766 0.631 11.643 664.413 12.762
2008 2.622 0.769 0.634 11.652 670.900 12.867
2009 2.575 0.751 0.654 11.637 667.860 12.358
2010 2.534 0.738 0.654 11.644 675.888 12.348
Total 2.674 0.803 0.623 11.650 634.876 12.715
Table A.4
Average county values of economic variables by state.
State Unrelated variety – UV Related variety – RV Technological homogeneity – LOS Urbanization Average weekly wage Average establishment size
AZ 3.190 1.137 0.583 11.877 664.768 17.117
CA 3.236 1.224 0.555 10.215 766.598 11.450
CO 2.557 0.743 0.653 12.119 637.348 10.552
NM 2.675 0.808 0.639 12.679 594.237 12.779
NV 2.342 0.670 0.686 12.955 797.435 17.200
OK 2.787 0.754 0.606 11.509 558.598 13.056
TX 2.498 0.710 0.638 11.612 623.436 12.987
UT 2.863 0.887 0.597 12.430 597.785 11.590
Total 2.674 0.803 0.623 11.650 634.876 12.715
Table A.5
Selected agencies for federal environmental funds, and CFFR source categories.
Agency CFFR category
Agricultural Research Service Grants (GG), procurement contracts (PC)
Agricultural Stabilization and
Conservation Service
Direct loans (DL), direct payments other than for individuals (DX), grants (GG), procurement contracts (PC)
Bureau of Land Management Grants (GG), procurement contracts (PC)
Environmental Protection Agency Grants (GG), procurement contracts (PC)
Farm Service Agency Direct loans (DL), direct payments for individuals (other than retirement and disability – DO), guaranteed/insured loans (GL),
procurement contracts (PC)
Federal Crop Insurance Corporation Insurance (II)
Federal Emergency Management
Agency
Direct payments other than for individuals (DX), grants (GG), insurance (II), procurement contracts (PC)
Forest Service Grants (GG), procurement contracts (PC)
National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration
Direct loans (DL), grants (GG), procurement contracts (PC)
National Park Service Direct payments other than for individuals (DX), grants (GG), procurement contracts (PC)
Natural Resources Conservation
Service
Direct payments for individuals (other than retirement and disability – DO), direct payments other than for individuals (DX),
grants (GG), procurement contracts (PC)
Risk Management Agency Insurance (II), procurement contracts (PC)
Rural Development Administration Direct loans (DL), grants (GG), guaranteed/insured loans (GL)
Soil Conservation Service Direct payments other than for individuals (DX), grants (GG), procurement contracts (PC)
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Direct payments other than for individuals (DX), grants (GG), procurement contracts (PC)
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Regression models3
Vulnerability analysis
Table A.10 and Fig. A.1 show the over dispersion of the
dependent variable we consider for vulnerability (i.e., the total
number of weather events with adverse impacts).
Fig. A.2 points the positive correlation between GDP and the
total number of weather events with adverse effects. The ﬁgure,
Table A.9
Percentage number of counties issuing municipal bonds and average risk premium
for municipal bonds with different maturities, by state.
State % of Issuing
counties
2 Years
maturity
3 Years
maturity
5 Years
maturity
10 Years
maturity
AZ 26 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.20
CA 33 0.51 0.49 0.42 0.40
CO 12 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.30
NM 12 0.33 0.40 0.48 0.37
NV 11 0.24 0.33 0.28 0.14
OK 12 0.25 0.42 0.52 0.22
TX 14 0.37 0.41 0.45 0.49
UT 10 0.41 0.41 0.44 0.29
Total 15 0.39 0.43 0.44 0.40
Table A.8
Percentage number of counties issuing municipal bonds and average risk premium
for municipal bonds with different maturities, by year.
Year % of Issuing
counties
2 Years
maturity
3 Years
maturity
5 Years
maturity
10 Years
maturity
1998 17 1.20 1.11 0.94 0.88
1999 15 1.37 1.32 1.18 0.93
2000 13 1.56 1.43 1.24 0.90
2001 15 0.40 0.51 0.68 0.62
2002 16 0.15 0.23 0.39 0.46
2003 16 0.11 0.05 0.20 0.17
2004 16 0.30 0.43 0.46 0.40
2005 17 0.82 0.78 0.63 0.45
2006 15 1.11 1.03 0.93 0.82
2007 16 0.62 0.59 0.60 0.71
2008 13 0.81 0.74 0.57 0.37
2009 15 0.93 0.73 0.58 0.54
2010 16 0.57 0.49 0.39 0.42
Total 15 0.39 0.43 0.44 0.40
Table A.7
Average per capita values at 2010 prices of selected federal expenditures and
obligations by state.
State Total transfers Environmental and recovery agencies
AZ 6857 245
CA 7783 626
CO 8247 1590
NM 10,207 416
NV 7925 1839
OK 6493 401
TX 8342 1035
UT 5547 159
Total 7913 885
Table A.6
Average per capita values at 2010 prices of selected federal expenditures and
obligations by year.
Fiscal year Total transfers Environmental and recovery agencies
1998 5623 736
1999 6229 793
2000 6362 725
2001 7062 700
2002 7547 790
2003 7369 743
2004 7511 879
2005 7607 767
2006 8186 968
2007 8626 746
2008 10,051 1249
2009 10,780 1246
2010 9907 1158
Total 7913 885
Table A.10
Descriptive statistics of quarterly number of events, southwestern U.S. counties,
1998–2010.
Statistics Value Statistics Value
Mean 1.294 Min 0
Std. dev. 2.456 Max 46
Variance 6.030 Quantile 25% 0
Skewness 4.809 Median 0
Kurtosis 44.483 Quantile 75% 2
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Fig. A.2. Total number of events over GDP, southwestern U.S. counties, 1998–2010.
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Fig. A.1. Distribution of quarterly total number of events, counties in southwestern
U.S., 1998–2010.
3 All regressions presented in this work have been made using Stata Statistical
Software, Release 13.
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along the theoretical reasons discussed in the paper, suggests the
usage of GDP as measure of exposure to natural hazards.
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